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EPA’s Proposed Clean Power
PlanUnder the EPA’s 111(d) rule, states can choose to comply
individually or in cooperation. States can also choose to
comply with a rate-based standard, which limits the
average emissions rate of affected electricity generating
units (EGUs), or a mass-based standard, which limits the
mass of CO2 emitted by affected EGUs. Modeling the
economic effects of these decisions suggests that
compliance is likely to increase electricity costs,
significantly increase net revenues for natural gas
combined-cycle units and reduce net revenues for coal
units.David Luke Oates and Paulina JaramilloI. IntroductionIn June 2014, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) proposed a rule entitled
‘‘Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units’’ (hereafter:
‘‘the 111(d) rule’’) (EPA, 2014a).lsevier Inc. This is an open access article under th
by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.201The rule uses the agency’s
authority under §111(d) of the
Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate
CO2 emissions from affected
electricity generating units
(EGUs) in the United States. In
promulgating the rule, the agency
acknowledged the negative
impacts of climate change on the
health of Americans and notede CC BY-NC-ND
5.03.007
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Table 1: Four Building Blocks Constituting BSER and Their Associated Targets Under the 111(d) Rule
Building Block Target
Heat Rate Improvement at Coal/Oil EGUs 6 percent improvement in coal EGU heat rates
Fuel Switching from Coal/Oil to NGCC NGCC units achieve 70 percent capacity factor
Non-Hydro Renewables and ‘‘New and At-Risk’’ Nuclear Average of RPS target of states that
have an RPS within their region, states
continue to use at-risk nuclear as defined by EIA
Demand Side Energy Efficiency Incremental EE growth of 0.2 percent per year
from 2012 baseline to ‘‘best practice’’ level
of 1.5 percent per year, then sustained through 2030
Athat the rule would help to
mitigate these effects.
T he Regulatory ImpactAnalysis the EPA performed
for the proposed rule (EPA,
2014b) predicts that by 2030 the
rule would reduce electric power
sector CO2 emissions by 30
percent below 2005 levels. While
likely not sufficient to reach
climate stabilization targets, even
if similar reductions were
achieved across the economy and
around the world, such
reductions are large enough to
require significant changes in
how electricity is produced and
consumed in the United States.
Section 111(d) of the Clean Air
Act limits the EPA’s authority
with respect to how reductions in
CO2 emissions are to be achieved.
The agency is able to set standards
of performance for CO2 emissions
from existing EGUs, but cannot
dictate how these standards are to
be reached. Instead, states must
decide how to achieve the
standard and must submit plans
to the EPA detailing the
implementation of the standard.
The EPA set standards ofpril 2015, Vol. 28, Issue 3 1040-6190/# 2015 T
license (httpperformance by first defining the
Best System of Emissions
Reductions (BSER) for achieving
such reductions. They then
determined the extent of
emissions reductions achievable
in each state by implementing
BSER. Finally, the agency set
standards of performance
achievable using BSER.
The Best System of Emissions
Reduction the EPA identified
consisted of four building blocks:
(1) heat rate improvements at
coal- and oil-fired EGUs, (2) fuel
switching from coal and oil-fired
EGUs to natural gas combined
cycle (NGCC) EGUs, (3) increased
use of non-hydro renewables and
new and at-risk nuclear, and (4)
increased use of demand-side
energy efficiency. The agency
determined targets for each
building block that constituted
BSER and reported these in the
proposed rule. Table 1
summarizes these targets.
The EPA expressed the 111(d)
rule performance standards as
‘‘rates’’ that must be met on
average within each state, or
within each group of states ifhe Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an o
://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).,states choose to comply
cooperatively. Though expressed
in units of lb/MWh, these
performance standards are not
true emissions rates. Because they
include energy efficiency and
some, but not all, renewable and
nuclear generation, these rates
cannot be interpreted as average
CO2 emissions rates for fossil
units or average CO2 emissions
rates for the entire fleet of
generators. We show the form of
the 111(d) rule explicitly in Eq. (1).
W hile the agency’s analysissuggests that the building
blocks for each state have been
‘‘adequately demonstrated’’
(EPA, 2014a), public commenters
have critiqued the proposed rule
both on the basis that the
measures are not achievable
(EPRI, 2014) and on the basis that
they do not go far enough
(SierraClub, 2014). For the
purpose of this work, however,
we take no position on the EPA’s
assessment of what constitutes
BSER. Instead, we take the
standard as given and evaluate
some of the effects that would
result were the standard to bepen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2015.03.007
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We focus on the effects
of two implementation
decisions: whether to
comply on a mass- or
rate-basis and whether
to comply individually
or in cooperation with
other states.
28implemented as proposed. This
work expands on the analyses the
EPA already performed in their
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)
(EPA, 2014b) using the agency’s
Integrated Planning Model (IPM).
We focus on the effects of two
implementation decisions that
states will have to make to comply
with the rule: whether to comply
on a mass- or rate-basis and
whether to comply individually
or in cooperation with other
states. In particular, we examine
(1) how state choices affect total
costs of compliance and total CO2
emissions, (2) how cooperation
affects the distribution of
economic surplus among the
states, (3) how the rule’s impacts
are distributed between
consumers and producers, (4)
how state decisions affect
shadow prices of electricity and
CO2, and (5) how state decisions
affect revenues for NGCC and
coal EGUs. We note that while
we have attempted to interpret
the 111(d) rule accurately, the
rule is complex, articulated in
legal language, and insufficiently
specific in certain instances. It is
possible that we have not
interpreted the rule as the EPA
would have wanted.
Furthermore, the rule has not yet
been finalized or interpreted by
the courts. The ‘‘correct’’
interpretation of the rule is
therefore subject to change in
the future. This work is thus
based on our best understanding
of the 111(d) rule as proposed,
rather than a definitive impact
analysis.1040-6190/# 2015 The Authors. Published by E
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/II. MethodsFor this analysis we constructed
a production cost minimization
model based on the EPA’s
Integrated Planning Model (IPM).
The model meets hourly load in a
number of transmission regions at
least production cost, subject to
the capacities of the EGUs in each
region and transmission
constraints between the regions.
In accordance with the 111(d)rule, the model also constrains the
CO2 emissions of EGUs affected
by the Clean Power Plan by
imposing either a rate-based or
mass-based emissions constraint.
The 111(d) constraint binds on
each state (or group of states if
regional cooperation is allowed)
on average over the course of a
year.
The model does not include
unit commitment, and therefore
does not include power plant
operating constraints and
objective function terms that
depend on the presence of integer
variables: minimum run and
minimum down times, minimumlsevier Inc. This is an open access article under th
by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.201generation levels, startup costs,
and no-load costs. The model also
does not include ramp rate
constraints. We made these
modeling choices to allow a
computationally feasible solution
for the whole country at the
hourly level. In previous work
(Oates and Jaramillo, 2013), we
found that fossil-fueled EGU
startups are associated with
emissions and production cost
penalties, but that these are small
compared to the emissions and
production costs from normal
operations. Therefore, though the
simplified model in this article
does not account for these effects,
we don’t believe these limitations
will qualitatively affect our
results. The full formulation of the
model is available in the
Supplementary Information.
T he model’s transmissionregions in the contiguous
United States align with those
used in the IPM. The IPM model
disaggregates the electricity
transmission system in the
contiguous U.S. into 64 regions
with transmission constraints
between them. The IPM model’s
regions roughly correspond to
both NERC Assessment Regions
and to the Energy Information
Administration’s National
Energy Modeling System (NEMS)
Regions (EPA, 2013). In certain
cases, the IPM’s regions provide
further disaggregation than
NERC or NEMS regions, in order
to capture both physical
transmission system constraints
and administrative subdivisions.
The EPA’s documentation on IPMe CC BY-NC-ND
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Table 2: Symbols Used in Rate-based and Mass-based Emissions Constraints
Variable Description
ej CO2 emissions rate of unit j [lb/MWh]
xPj ;t Electricity produced by unit j in period t [MWh]
SR Rate-based standard [lb/MWh]
SM Mass-based standard [lb]
Rt Renewables generation in period t [MWh]
N Electricity from new and at risk nuclear in period t [MWh]
h Avoided energy from energy efficiency per period (constant) [MWh]
Av.5.13 provides further details
about these transmission regions
(EPA, 2013).A. EGU aggregationIn order to reduce the solve
time of the optimization problem,
we implemented a procedure to
reduce the number of EGUs
present in the model by
aggregating similar units while
minimizing the effect on the
results. To do this, we first
subdivided EGUs in our data set
by (1) transmission region, (2)
state, (3) plant type, (4) fuel type,
and (5) whether the unit was
affected by the 111(d) rule. EGUs
sharing all five attributes were
then aggregated by summing
minimum and maximum
generation and by performing a
capacity-weighted average of
heat rates, current emissions
factors, fuel costs, and other
variable O&M costs.B. 111(d) ConstraintsFor the purposes of this
analysis, we took the EPA’spril 2015, Vol. 28, Issue 3 1040-6190/# 2015 T
license (httpstate-by-state emissions rate
standards (EPA, 2014a) as given.
In order to ensure compliance
with the standards during model
runs, we imposed constraints on
the production cost minimization
model. The rate-based
compliance scenarios used Eq. (1)
and the mass-based compliance
scenarios used Eq. (2). In Eqs. (1)
and (2), xPj;t is the only decision
variable. All other parameters in
the equations, including
electricity from new and at risk
nuclear and avoided energy from
efficiency, are fixed at the values
EPA specified in the proposed
111(d) rule (EPA, 2014a). Table 2
defines all symbols used in the
equations.
E q. (1) constrains the CO2emissions from affected
units (left-hand side) to be less
than or equal to the standard
times the quantity of generation
from affected units, plus non-
hydro renewables generation,
plus new and at-risk nuclear
generation, plus energy efficiency
(right-hand side). Note that Eq. (1)
does not constrain mass
emissions of CO2 directly. If morehe Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an o
://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).,or less electricity is generated in a
particular region, the effective
mass limit of CO2 increases or
decreases, respectively.
Eq. (1) presents a slightly
simplified version of the rate-
based constraint used in the full
model. The rate-based standard
SR actually applies only to EGUs
within the state (or group of states
if cooperation is allowed) to
which an EGU belongs.
Therefore, there are actually
multiple constraints similar to
Eq. (1) in each model run – one for
each compliance region. Each
constraint only limits a subset of
all affected EGUs. The
Supplementary Information
shows the full constraint.
X
j
X
t
e jx
P
j;t  SR
X
t

X
j
xPj;t þ Rt þN þ h

(1)
Eq. (2) constrains the total CO2
emissions from affected units (left-
hand side) to be less than or equal
to a constant: the mass-based
standard. In the original proposal,
the EPA specifically allowed for
states to comply on a mass-basis
(EPA, 2014a), but did not specify
alternate mass-based standards
for each state. For the purposes of
this work, we assumed that the
EPA would allow states to set
mass-based standards at the level
of emissions that would occur if
the states were to comply with a
rate-based standard. We therefore
elected to use the mass emissions
resulting from compliance with
a rate-based standard as thepen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2015.03.007
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30mass-based standard in this work.
To do this, we used the results
from our model under compliance
with the rate-based standard,
calculated the quantity on the right
hand side of Eq. (1), and used this
quantity as the mass based
standard SM in Eq. (2) for the mass-
based compliance scenarios.X
j
X
t
e jx
P
j;t  SM (2)
owever, in a recent noticeThe agency’s
method results
in some differences
in state-by-state
mass-based caps
compared to
the method
used in this work.H (EPA, 2014c), the EPA
provided more information about
how mass-based standards might
be calculated and example
calculations for each state. The
method the agency used to
calculate mass-based standards
yielded results similar to our
own. Nationwide, the agency’s
mass-based standard is 1 percent
less than the mass-based
standard used in this work. This
difference is largely due to the
fact that the agency did not
incorporate load growth in its
conversion from a rate-based to a
mass-based standard, whereas
the method used in this work
implicitly does incorporate such
growth (by using compliance
year load, as forecast by the EPA,
when solving our rate-based
model). We also note that the
agency’s method results in some
differences in state-by-state mass-
based caps compared to the
method used in this work. The
Supplementary Information
provides additional details about
the differences between the
values used in this article and
those EPA recently suggested.1040-6190/# 2015 The Authors. Published by E
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/C. Surplus calculation and
allocationIn Section III, we report
differences between producer,
consumer, and government
surpluses across scenarios. We
calculated surplus values in post-
processing, based on the results of
the optimization model. First, we
assumed an inelastic demand
curve for electricity, with a cutoff
value, L [$/MWh], representingthe price above which the
quantity of electricity demanded
drops to zero. In this work, we
report only differences in surplus
across scenarios, such that L drops
out of the calculations.
S econd, we used the shadowprices of electricity in each
transmission region in each
period to divide total surplus
between producers and
consumers. Third, in the mass-
based compliance scenarios, we
assumed that the government of
each state earned revenues from
the sale of all CO2 emissions
allowances for that state at the
prevailing shadow price of CO2.lsevier Inc. This is an open access article under th
by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.201Fourth, we allocated congestion
rents equally between producers
and consumers. Congestion rents
occur when transmission lines
between adjacent regions are
loaded to their full capacity and
markets on either side of the lines
have different electricity prices.
Congestion rents accrue on the
transmission region level. In
order to report surplus values at
the state level, we allocated these
transmission region-level rents to
states in proportion to the
dispatchable generation in each
transmission region performed by
generators in a particular state
under the reference scenario (see
Section II.E for more on the
scenarios and the Supplementary
Information for more on the
allocation mechanism). The
allocation factors are therefore
constant over time and between
scenarios.D. Wind profilesOur compliance scenarios take
the renewable energy targets the
EPA specified in the proposed
111(d) rule as given (EPA, 2014a)
(as further detailed in the
Supplementary Information). For
modeling purposes, we assume
that the renewable energy targets
will be met using wind power. We
used data from the IPM to
generate wind power output
profiles for each hourly period in
the optimization model. Using
data from NREL (EPA, 2013), the
IPM provides winter- and
summer-day wind profiles by
wind and cost class in eache CC BY-NC-ND
5.03.007
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Atransmission region and state. We
used the summer-day profile in
May through September, and the
winter-day profile for the
remainder of the year. The IPM
also provides the total potential
wind capacity in each region. In
order to generate the wind
profiles used in this work, we
selected profiles in order of
increasing cost class and
decreasing wind class within each
state. We then aggregated these
profiles such that the annual wind
energy in each state was equal to
the target.E. Scenarios studiedWe examined seven scenarios
in this work: one reference
scenario and six compliance
scenarios. The reference scenario
does not have any 111(d)
compliance constraints. The
compliance scenarios consist of
combinations of three types of
cooperation for compliance
(state, regional, and national)
and two types of standard
(rate-based and mass-based).
Each compliance scenario has a
compliance constraint as
defined by Eq. (1) or (2). In the
regional compliance scenarios,
we used the regional cooperation
groups EPA suggested in the
111(d) rule regulatory impact
analysis (EPA, 2014b). Our
national compliance scenarios
allowed cooperation among
all of the states in the
contiguous U.S.
The reference scenario deserves
further discussion. The fact thatpril 2015, Vol. 28, Issue 3 1040-6190/# 2015 T
license (httpthe reference scenario lacks
compliance constraints is the only
difference between it and the
compliance scenarios. Load
profiles, fuel costs, wind and
hydro profiles, CO2 emissions
rates, tie line capacities, and the
fleet of generators in service are
the same under the reference
scenario as they are under the
compliance scenarios. Thismeans, in particular, that changes
in the fleet occurring in response
to the 111(d) rule are reflected in
the reference scenario.
Conceptually, the reference
scenario can be interpreted as the
result that would occur if
capacity expansion decisions
were to be made in the
expectation that the 111(d) rule
was going to come into full effect
into 2030, but the rule were then
not to actually come into effect.
The comparisons between the
reference scenario and the
compliance scenarios therefore
only reflect the dispatch stage
effects of the 111(d) rule, ignoring
the capacity expansion
implications.he Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an o
://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).,III. Results and
DiscussionFigure 1 shows tradeoffs
between total production costs
and CO2 emissions on an annual
basis between the scenarios. The
slopes of the dashed lines
connecting the reference scenario
to the highest- and lowest-cost
compliance scenario represent
short-term compliance costs
(short term in that they only
include production cost differences
in the compliance year of 2030).
Our results indicate that these
short-term compliance costs
range between 17 $/ton CO2 and
24 $/ton CO2. Notably, costs for
implementing energy efficiency
programs, installing additional
renewable and NGCC capacity,
and preventing retirement of at-
risk nuclear EGUs are not
included in these cost estimates.
Figure 1 also indicates that, for
either the rate-based or the mass-
based standard, production costs
decrease as the level of
cooperation increases.
Furthermore, the figure shows
that, for a given level of
cooperation, compliance costs
under the mass-based standard
are consistently lower than under
the rate-based standard. Finally,
the figure shows that total
emissions increase slightly with
cooperation under the rate-based
standard, but the rate standard
consistently has slightly lower
emissions than the mass-based
standard.
P roduction costs are lowerand emissions are higher
pen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2015.03.007
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[(Figure_1)TD$FIG]
Figure 1: Production Cost – CO2 Emissions Tradeoff. Note That Both Axes Have Been Truncated
32under the mass-based constraint
compared to the rate-based
constraint (for a given level of
cooperation) due primarily to the
fact that the form of the mass-
based constraint allows more
leakage to non-affected units.
Under the rate-based constraint,
shifting production from affected
units to non-affected units is not a
very good strategy to achieve
compliance since reducing the
generation of affected units also
reduces the effective emissions
cap according to Eq. (1). However,
under the mass-based standard,
shifting production from affected
units to non-affected units simply
reduces the emissions on the left
hand side of Eq. (2). Higher
emitting, but lower cost, affected
units can then be used to fill the
additional emissions budget.
T otal emissions increase withcooperation under the rate-
based standard primarily due to
the fact that, under state1040-6190/# 2015 The Authors. Published by E
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/compliance, some of the rate-
based emissions constraints are
not binding. States whose
standards are not binding emit
less than the standard with a CO2
price of 0. When cooperating,
these states may increase their
emissions while still satisfying the
standard.A. Surplus change with
complianceFigure 2 shows the change in
consumer, producer, and
government surplus from the
reference scenario to compliance
scenarios with no cooperation.
Compliance with the 111(d) rule
tended to decrease total surplus,
however, there was an unequal
distribution of the change in
surplus between consumers and
producers: in general, compliance
led to increases in producer
surplus and losses in consumer
surplus. This effect was likely duelsevier Inc. This is an open access article under th
by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.201to increases in electricity prices
under compliance scenarios. The
figure also shows that the
magnitude of the surplus effects
was larger under mass-based
compliance than under rate-based
compliance.
U nder the mass-basedscheme, government
proceeds from allowance auctions
(indicated by government surplus
in Figure 2) are significant. Due to
the mass-based standard’s
significantly larger negative effect
on consumers, state governments
choosing to comply on a mass
basis should consider using
auction proceeds to compensate
consumers. Variation in auction
proceeds between the states
means that this will be easier for
some states than others.
Nationwide, allocating auction
proceed to consumers could offset
94 percent of the additional loss in
consumer surplus resulting from
mass-based compliancee CC BY-NC-ND
5.03.007
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[(Figure_2)TD$FIG]
Figure 2: Changes in Consumer, Producer, and Government Surplus from Non-Compliance to No-Cooperation Compliance for (A) A Rate-
based Standard and (B) A Mass-based Standard. Black Lines Indicate Net Surplus Change. Note That the Scale of the y-Axis is Smaller for
the Rate Standard (A) Than for the Mass Standard (B)
Acompared to rate-based
compliance.B. Total surplus change with
cooperationFigure 3 shows the change in
total surplus (producer surplus +
consumer surplus + governmentpril 2015, Vol. 28, Issue 3 1040-6190/# 2015 T
license (httpsurplus) between a regional
cooperation scenario and a no-
cooperation scenario. Summed
across the country, the total
surplus change is positive,
reflecting the fact that total
costs are lower under regional
cooperation (as shown in
Figure 1).he Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an o
://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).,Figure 3 also shows that,
despite the fact that cooperation
will lead to lower costs overall,
not all states will benefit from
cooperation. There may therefore
be a role for a federal body, such
as the EPA, to facilitate
negotiations between states to
enable the achievement of apen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2015.03.007
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[(Figure_3)TD$FIG]
Figure 3: Changes in Total Surplus from No-Cooperation Compliance to Regional-Cooperation Compliance for (A) A Rate-based Standard
and (B) A Mass-based Standard. Note That the Scale of the y-Axis is Larger for the Rate Standard (A) Than for the Mass Standard (B)
34lower-cost cooperative outcome.
Such negotiations would be
complicated both by the fact that
the surplus losses shown in
Figure 3 are borne by three groups
of entities (consumers, producers,
and state governments) and by
the overlapping jurisdictions of
states and transmission
organizations such as RTOs. See
the Supplementary Information
for the distribution of surplus
changes between consumers,
producers, and the government.1040-6190/# 2015 The Authors. Published by E
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/C. Shadow prices of CO2 and
electricityFigure 4 shows the shadow CO2
prices. These shadow prices can
be understood as the marginal
costs of reducing CO2 emissions,
in contrast to the values in Figure
1, which are the average costs of
reducing CO2 emissions by
hundreds of millions of tons.
Figure 4 provides a number of
qualitative insights. First, shadow
prices of CO2 are significantlylsevier Inc. This is an open access article under th
by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.201higher than average for a number
of states under rate-based
compliance with no cooperation.
Shadow prices of CO2 for
Wyoming, Montana, Kentucky,
and West Virginia all exceed the
90th percentile of state prices
under rate-based compliance
with no cooperation. All of these
states lack affected NGCC
capacity. This means that in these
states, it can be much more costly
to achieve emissions reductions at
the margin. Second, shadowe CC BY-NC-ND
5.03.007
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Table 3: Symbols Used in Electricity Price Comparison
Variable Description
lMk ;t
Shadow price of electricity under mass standard in transmission region k during time t [$/MWh]
lRk ;t
Shadow price of electricity under rate standard in transmission region k during time t [$/MWh]
cj Marginal cost of marginal unit j (in transmisison region k and compliance region l) [$/MWh]
mMl
Shadow price of CO2 under mass standard in compliance region l [$/lb]
mRl
Shadow price of CO2 under rate standard in compliance region l [$/lb]
ej CO2 emissions rate of marginal unit j [lb/MWh]
sRl Rate standard in compliance region l [lb/MWh]
[(Figure_4)TD$FIG]
Figure 4: Shadow Prices of CO2 Under (A) the Rate-based Standard and (B) the Mass-based Standard
April 2015, Vol. 28, Issue 3 1040-6190/# 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2015.03.007
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[(Figure_5)TD$FIG]
Figure 5: Shadow Prices of Electricity Under (A) the Rate-based Standard and (B) the Mass-based Standard
36prices of CO2 are zero for a
number of states under state-
based compliance without
cooperation, indicating that the
111(d) standard is not binding in
these states. Similarly, the
Northeast region has a shadow
price of CO2 of zero under
regional cooperation. The fact that
shadow CO2 prices are never zero
(except in Vermont, where there is1040-6190/# 2015 The Authors. Published by E
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/no standard) under mass-based
compliance results from the
method we used to determine
mass-based standards (see
Supplementary Information).
T he electricity price inFigure 5 also shows a
number of qualitative results.
First, compliance leads to
increased electricity prices
compared to the reference case.lsevier Inc. This is an open access article under th
by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.201We note that this result is at odds
with some of the results reported
by the EPA.1 Second, it is clear
from the figure that electricity
prices increase much more
significantly under mass-based
compliance than under rate-based
compliance. Eqs. (3) and (4) show
the relationships between shadow
prices, EGU costs, and EGU
emissions rates for the marginale CC BY-NC-ND
5.03.007
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Aunit under the mass-based and
rate-based standard, respectively.
Table 3 defines the symbols used
in the equations.
Eq. (3) suggests that the shadow
price of electricity, under a mass-
based standard, must be high
enough to compensate the
marginal unit for its marginal
costs plus its CO2 emissions costs.
These CO2 emissions costs, under
a mass-based standard, are given
by the product of the shadow
price of CO2 and the emissions
rate of the marginal unit. As the
[(Figure_6)TD$FIG]
Figure 6: National Average Net Revenues, Sh
Revenues, for (A) NGCC Units, and (B) Coal U
pril 2015, Vol. 28, Issue 3 1040-6190/# 2015 T
license (httpshadow price of CO2 and the
emissions rate are both positive
quantities, the CO2 emissions
costs for the marginal unit are
always positive.
lMk;t ¼ c j þ mMl e j (3)
Under a rate-based standard,
the shadow price of electricity
must again be high enough to
compensate the marginal unit for
its marginal costs plus its CO2
emissions costs. While the
marginal operating costs of the
marginal unit will be the sameowing Contributions of Electricity Market Reven
nits. Black Lines Indicate Net Revenues, Whic
he Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an o
://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).,under both standards, the CO2
emissions costs have a different
form under the rate-based
standard. Under the rate-based
standard, CO2 emissions costs are
given by the product of the
shadow price of CO2 and the
difference between the marginal
unit’s emissions rate and the rate-
based standard. Since some units
have emissions rates lower than
the rate-based standards, this
quantity can be negative. For such
a marginal unit, ‘‘CO2 emissions
costs’’ are actually CO2 emissionsues, Fuel + VOM Costs, and CO2 Costs or
h are also Labeled
pen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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lRk;t ¼ c j þ mRl ðe j  sRj Þ (4)
Figure 4 shows that, for the same
level of cooperation, shadow prices
of CO2 are quite similar under rate-
based and mass-based compliance.
It therefore follows that CO2
emissions costs are, for the most
part, lower under a rate-based
[(Figure_7)TD$FIG]
Figure 7: Net Revenues for NGCC Units Across A
1040-6190/# 2015 The Authors. Published by E
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/standard than under a mass-based
standard. It then follows from
Eqs. (3) and (4) that the shadow
price of electricity is lower as well.D. Effect of compliance on
coal and NGCC unit revenuesFigure 6 shows national
average operating revenues andll Scenarios for All States Under (A) the Rate-base
lsevier Inc. This is an open access article under th
by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.201costs for NGCC and coal EGUs
under each scenario, including
the breakdown between revenues
from electricity sales, costs for fuel
and variable O&M, and CO2
emissions costs or revenues. Note
that the figure does not include
the portion of congestion rents
allocated to producers, as there is
no obvious way to allocate thesed Standard and (B) the Mass-based Standard
e CC BY-NC-ND
5.03.007
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Ato EGUs of different types and an
equal allocation would not affect
comparison between EGUs of
different types. Note also that that
the net revenues calculated here
do not include uplift payments,
capacity market revenues, or
ancillary service revenues and
therefore represent very
conservative estimates of net
revenues under compliance with
the standard. We focus our
discussion on differences in these
estimates across scenarios to
avoid over-interpreting the
absolute levels. The figure shows
that net revenues increase for
NGCC units and decrease for coal
units under compliance scenarios.
In fact, NGCC net revenues more
than double, while coal net
revenues decrease by more than
85 percent under a rate-based
standard with no cooperation
compared to the reference case.
For both NGCC and coal units,
net revenues are higher under
mass-based compliance than
under rate-based compliance. In
both cases, this is largely due to
the higher electricity price under
mass-based compliance.
Figure 6 also shows that for
NGCC units under a mass-based
standard and coal units under both
rate-based and mass-based
standards, participation in CO2
markets entails a cost. However,
for NGCC units under a rate-based
standard, participating in CO2
markets generates revenue. Due to
the fact that NGCC units have, on
average, emissions rates lower
than the rate-based standards,
these units receive a paymentpril 2015, Vol. 28, Issue 3 1040-6190/# 2015 T
license (httpunder rate-based compliance
scenarios (as suggested by Eq. (4)).
Also note that while coal units
always incur costs in CO2 markets,
they pay substantially less under a
rate-based standard than under a
mass-based standard.
T he national average netrevenues reported in Figure
6 disguise significant regional
variation.Figure 7 shows the variation in
NGCC net revenues across all
states for all scenarios. Despite the
fact that national average net
revenues for NGCC units are
higher under a mass-based
standard, several states show the
opposite trend: NGCC units in
Utah, Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri,
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and
Wisconsin have higher net
revenues under the rate-based
standard than under the mass-
based standard for a given level of
cooperation. This is despite the
fact that electricity prices are
higher, even in these states, under
the mass-based standard. These
states have more than 100 MW of
affected NGCC capacity and
rate-based standards ofhe Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an o
://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).,1,200 lb/MWh or greater. The fact
that net revenues for NGCC units
are higher in states with very high
rate-based standards follows
from Eq. (4): CO2 revenues (which
only exist under the rate-based
standard) are proportional to the
standard. Indeed, NGCC units in
these eight states obtained 19
percent of their revenues from
CO2 under rate-based compliance
with no cooperation, compared to
7 percent nationwide.IV. ConclusionsOur analysis indicated that
production costs of compliance
decreased with increasing
cooperation and with mass-based
compliance compared to rate-
based compliance. Of the six
compliance scenarios considered,
production costs were lowest
under mass-based compliance
with national cooperation and
highest under rate-based
compliance with no cooperation.
Given the savings in production
costs, states should be interested
in collaborating with each other
and the EPA should encourage
them to do so.
H owever, our analysis alsoindicated that some states
had lower total surplus when
cooperating at a regional or
national level compared to
complying with no-cooperation.
These states may be inclined to
hold out rather than cooperate
with other states. States interested
in cooperative compliance should
consider compensation schemespen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2015.03.007
39
40for holdout states when
establishing the terms of
cooperation. The EPA should
consider the possibility of
brokering such compensation
schemes.
Our analysis also found that
compliance, compared to a
reference scenario including
energy efficiency, tended to
increase electricity prices. This
increase in prices increased short-
term producer surplus at the
expense of consumer surplus.
These effects were most dramatic
under mass-based compliance,
even though total production costs
were lower for mass-based
compliance. Costs were lower
under the mass-based standard
compared to the rate-based
standard due to the fact that the
mass-based standard allows more
leakage to non-affected units and
to Canada. Electricity prices were
higher under the mass-based
standard due to the fact that the
marginal unit’s marginal costs
include a higher cost of CO2
emissions than they do under the
rate-based standard. States
should be aware of this
distinction when deciding
between rate-based and mass-
based compliance. If states decide
to use mass-based compliance,
they should consider using
proceeds from allowance
auctions to offset the costs to
consumers.
F inally, we observed thatcompliance tended to
significantly increase net
revenues for NGCC units and
reduce net revenues for coal units.1040-6190/# 2015 The Authors. Published by E
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/At the national level, mass-based
compliance led to higher net
revenues compared to rate-based
compliance (for a given level of
cooperation) for both NGCC and
coal units. However for a select
group of states with very high
rate-based standards, NGCC
units fared better under rate-
based standards than mass-based
standards.The 111(d) rule is the latest piece
of climate-related regulation
promulgated using the EPA’s
authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act. The
rule’s focus on existing EGUs, its
national scope, and its meaningful
performance standards mean it is
potentially the most significant in
terms of its potential to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases
over the next decade and a half.
However, the rule’s complexity
and the significant flexibility
allowed to states in deciding how
to comply mean that the rule may
have some potentially
counterintuitive effects.
Accounting for these effects may
help state governments and other
affected entities to make morelsevier Inc. This is an open access article under th
by-nc-nd/4.0/)., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.201informed decisions when
complying with the rule.Appendix
A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated
with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2015.03.007.
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